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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
~F::. 
JOHN D. GLYNN, :;:~ ,: t 
Pktintiff and AppellaJnt, \ ' __ ,, 
vs. . .......... ~ ...... --J ..... _ .. , ~ 
MARJORIE DOCTORMAN ·------· 
DUBIN, aka MARJORIE 
DOCTOR'MAN and DESERET 
FEDERAL SAVINGS AND 
LOAN ASSOCIA'TION, 
-------·······: . • :~ Cul.ii":-1 ~~:.Od lar~;. ~\,.lf.n·"';a~ 
Case No. 93'88 
a corporation, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF - AP'PELLANT 
Appeal from the District Court of the Third 
Judicial District in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah 
J'OHN D. GLYNN 
In Propria Persona 
9171 Wilshire Boulevard 
Beverly Hills, California 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN D. GLYNN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
MARJORIE DOCTORMAN 
DUBIN, aka MARJORIE 
DOCTORMAN and DESERET 
FEDERAL SAVINGS AND 
L'OAN ASSOCIATION, 
a corporation, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 93'88 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF - APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal to the Supreme Court from 
a judgment of the District Court dismissing plain-
tiff's complaint seeking partition of real property 
held under a joint tenancy deed and granting judg-
ment on defendant's counterclaim quieting title to 
said real property in defendant Marjorie Doctor-
man Dubin. The word defendant used herein shall 




Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about July 22, 1957, defendant and Mar-
tin F. Dubin acquired as joint tenants property 
known as All of Lot 24, East Millbrook No. 2 in 
the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, according 
to the plat thereof, recorded in the Office of the 
County Recorder of said county. On said date de-
fendant and Martin F. Dubin were husband and 
wife and were residing in Salt Lake City while 
Martin F. Dubin was interning at Holy Cross Hos-
pital. In December, 1958, defendant filed an action 
(cause number 119467) in the District Court of 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah wherein she sought 
separate maintenance. Later amended complaints 
were filed in which defendant sought to obtain a 
divorce upon the ground among others, that Martin 
F. Dubin was incapable of reproduction and was 
further deficient in sexual capabilities. At the time 
of the filin,g of the original action for separate 
maintenance defendant had not been a resident of 
the State of Utah or the County of Salt Lake for 
three (3) months preceding the date of the filing 
of the complaint. In the Amended Compl~aints the 
aforesaid parcel of property was put in issue as a 
result of defendant's request that the 'Court enter 
an order conveying· to her all of Martin F. Dubin's 
·right, title and interest in and to the property, or 
in the alternative for an order requiring Martin F. 
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Dubin to m'ake a conveyance of the property to de-
fendant. In said amended complaints defendant al-
leged that the property was accumulated prior to 
her marriage to Martin F. Dubin even though said 
complaints alleged that the marri~age occurred March 
18, 1956, which was prior to the date of the joint 
tenancy deed. Martin F. Dubin filed an Answer 
and Cross-Complaint in which he alleged as his 
grounds for divorce, among other things, that de-
fendant had failed to ~advise him that she had been 
married before and had had said marriage annulled. 
Martin F. Dubin further alleged in his cross-com-
plaint that the real property was acquired through 
the couple's joint efforts and to their joint benefit an·d 
asked the court to award him a just and equitable 
share of the property and the income therefrom. 
In connection with said action, Martin F. 
Dubin, who had been residing in California with 
defendant, retained plaintiff herein as his c~alif­
ornia legal counsel. Plaintiff thereafter associated 
himself with E. R. Callister as Utah counsel and 
upon Mr. Callister's appointment to the Supreme 
Court with Walter Budge, Esq. also of the Utah Bar 
Association. On December 6, 1959, plaintiff and 
Dr. Martin F. Dubin flew to Salt Lake City for 
trial of the action scheduled for December 8, 1959. 
On December 7, 1959, Martin F. Dubin at the in-
stance and request of plaintiff by Quit-Claim Deed 
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conveyed to plaintiff all of his right, title 'and inter-
est in and to his portion of the joint tenancy pro-
perty. The consideration for said deed as alleged by 
plaintiff was the cancellation of $3,000.00 in legal 
fees owing to plaintiff by Martin F. Dubin, the sum 
of $100.00 and the execution of a promissory note by 
plaintiff in f·avor of Martin F. Dubin for $'5,000.00, 
payable $100.00 per month, including interest, com-
mencing January 7, 1960, until principal and in-
terest had been paid. Said deed was recorded on 
December 7, 1959. 
On the morning of December 8, 1959, plain-
tiff and Walter E. Budge, Esq. appeared in Judge 
Ellett's court as co-counsel for Martin F. Dubin. 
On said morning said counsel successfully argued 
that the Court was without jurisdiction to proceed 
in that at the date of filing of the original com-
plaint for separate maintenance defendant did not 
meet the necessary residence requirement. The court 
granted ·a dismissal of the action on or about 2:00 
p.m. on said date. 
Later, on the afternoon of December 8, 1959, 
Martin F. Dubin executed at the instance and re-
quest of plaintiff another Quit-Claim Deed in favor 
of plaintiff to said property in form and substance 
more or less identical to the earlier deed. Plaintiff 
also executed another similar promissory note in 
favor of M'artin F. Dubin and said note and said 
quit-clain1 deed were recorded on said date. 
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Prior to December 7, 1959, defendant had 
caused to be 1·ecorded a lis pendens as to S'aid pro-
perty in which notice was given of the law suit filed 
in December, 1958, which suit was dismissed on 
De'cember 8, 1959. After the action was dismissed 
on December 8, 1959, defendant on the afternoon 
of said date caused a second suit (cause number 
123578) to be filed and allegedly thereafter caused 
another lis pendens to be recorded pertaining to 
said real property. 
Prior to the dismissal of the first action on 
December 8, 1959, plaintiff withdrew as counsel 
for Dr. Martin F. Dubin in open court and the 
court minutes so indicate. The summons and com-
plaint applicable to the second 'action filed on De-
cember 8, 1959, were served upon Martin F. Dubin 
some time later in Los Angeles, California. Plain-
tiff did not represent Martin F. Dubin in said ac-
tion and an appearance and answer was not made to 
said complaint. 
On or about the 27th day of January, 1960, a 
default hearing was held on the second divorce ac-
tion at which time defendant was granted a divorce 
and in which the decree signed by Honorable Ray 
A. Van Cott stated in part: 
"Plaintiff be, and she hereby is, awarded 
as her sole and separate property free and 
clear of any claims of the Defendant the fol-
lowing described real property located in Salt 
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Lake County, State of Utah, to wit: Lot 24, 
East Mill Brook No. 2, according to the offi-
cial plats of Salt Lake County.'' 
At the time of the hearing on said default di-
vorce the District Court was not advised that either 
of the quit-claim deeds had been executed and re-
corded even though defendant and both defendant's 
counsel, Bernard Rose and Dean Conder, h'ad per-
sonal knowledge of such facts. 
In May, 1960, plaintiff commenced the instant 
action by filing a complaint in which he sought to 
partition the aforesaid real property. Defendant 
filed an Answer and Counter Claim in which among 
other things, defendant admitted that plaintiff's 
complaint set forth a cause of action for partition. 
The exact nature of defendant's counter-claim is 
uncertain although it prays for a judgment quiet-
ing title to the real property in defendant. 
A trial of the instant action was had before 
Honorable Ray A. Van Cott (who had heard the 
default divorce case) on November 9, 1960. At the 
con!clusion of plaintiff's ease defendant moved for 
a dismissal of plaintiff's complaint and for judg-
ment on her counter clain1. Although no evidence 
was introduced or presented by defendant the 
court granted both of defendant's requests. Before 
granting defendant's judgment on her counter claim 
the court specificially asked ( T. R. p. 35) defen-
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dant's counsel whether he was satisfied with the 
evidence on the counter claim to which said counsel 
replied that he was. This is an appeal from that 
decree. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
A. DEFECTIVE PLEADING OF COUNTERCLAIM 
OF DEFENDANT. 
POINT I. 
THE COUNTERCLAIM OF DEFENDANT FAILS 
TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER THE 
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT, AT 25-1-8, UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED, 1953. 
POINT II. 
THE ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM OF DE-
FENDANT FAIL TO ALLEGE FACTS SUFFICIENT 
TO CONSTITUTE A CAUSE OF ACTION TO ESTAB-
LISH A RESULTING TRUST IN FAVOR OF DEFEN-
DANT AND ANY EVIDENCE THEREON IS IN VI-
OLATION OF THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE. 
B. F AlLURE OF PROOF ON DEFENDANT'S 
COUYTERCLAIM OR DEFENSE. 
POINT III. 
DEFENDANT FAILED TO PROVE HER CAUSE 
OF ACTION OR DEFENSE UNDER THE FRAUDU-
LENT CONVEYANCE ACT, AT 25-1-8 UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED, 1953, OR ANY CAUSE OF ACTION TO 
ESTABLISH A RESULTING TRUST. 
C. DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE STANDING 
TO BRING AN ACTION UNDER THE FRAUDULENT 
CONVEYANCE ACT, AT 25-1-8 UTAH CODE ANNO-
TATED, 1953. 
POINT IV. 
DEFENDANT IS NOT A CREDITOR OR OTHER 
PERSON WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE UTAH 
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FRAUDULENT C·ONVEYANCE ACT SINCE SHE WAS 
NOT AWARDED SUPPORT OR MAINTENANCE. 
D. FAILURE TO FIND ON MATERIAL ISSUES. 
POINT V. 
THE COURT FAILED TO FIND ON MATERIAL 
FACTS OR ISSUES UNDER AN ACTION BASED ON 
THE FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT AT 25-1-8, 
UTAH CODE ANN'OTATED, 1953. 
POINT VI. 
ASSUMING THAT DEFENDANT'S ANSWER AND 
COUNTERCLAIM SET FORTH A CAUSE OF ACTION 
TO ESTABLISH A RESULTING TRUST THE COURT 
FAILED TO FIND ON MATERIAL FACTS OR ISSUES. 
E. EFFECT OF INSTITUTION OF DIVORCE 
PROCEEDINGS BY WIFE. 
POINT VII. 
THE INSTITUTION OF A DIVORCE ACTION 
DOES NOT PUT THE PROPERTY INTO THE CUS-
TODY OF THE COURT AND DOES NOT PREVENT 
THE EXERCISE OF THE HUSBAND'S POWERS OVER 
THE PROPERTY. 
F. ATTORNEY'S FEES AS CONSIDERATION 
FOR A CONVEYANCE. 
POINT VIII. 
A CONVEYANCE MADE TO THE HUSBAND'S 
ATTORNEY IN A DIVORCE ACTION IS AS VALID 
AS ANY OTHER CONVEYANCE MADE FOR V ALU-
ABLE CONSIDERATION AND WITHOUT INTENT TO 
HINDER, DELAY OR DEFRAUD CREDITORS OR 
OTHER PERSONS. 
G. LIS PENDENS. 
P'OINT IX. 
THE LIS PENDENS ARE NOT MATERIAL TO A 
DETERMINATION OF THE ISSUES. 
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ARGUMENT 
A. DEFECTIVE PLEADING OF COUNTERCLAIM 
OF DEFENDANT. 
POINT I. 
THE COUNTERCLAIM OF DEFENDANT FAILS 
TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER THE 
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT, AT 25-1-8, UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED, 1953. 
It is difficult to determine the exact nature of 
the counterclaim filed by defendant. The prayer of 
the counterclaim requests that defendant's title in 
the property be quieted against plaintiff and that 
the two quit-claim deeds be vacated and cancelled. 
The Pretrial Order states that defendant claims 
that the conveyance to plaintiff was in violation of 
the Fraudulent Conveyance Act, at 25-1-8 Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953. Assuming that the counter-
claim was intended to be framed under said code 
section, it is obvious that the counterclaim does not 
set forth facts sufficient to constitute a cause of 
action. Said code section provides in pertinent part: 
"Every conveyance or assignment in writ-
ing or otherwise ... made with the intent to 
delay, hinder or defraud creditors, or other 
persons, of their lawful suits, damages, for-
feitures, debts or demands ... shall be void." 
Section 25-1-13 of said Act further provides: 
"The provisions of this chapter shall not 
be construed to affect or impair the title of 
a purchaser for a valu·able consideration, un-
less it appears that such purchaser had pre-
vious notice of the fraudulent intent of his 
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immediate grantor, or of the fraud render-
ing void the title of such grantor." 
Section 25-1-7 of said Act further provides 
that "·actual intent" to hinder, delay or defraud 
creditors is necessary in order to invoke the provi-
sions of said Act in point herein. Smith, et al v. 
Edw.ards, Utah 1932, ________________________ , states: 
"And the r~tle is that the facts upon which 
fraud is predicated must be specifically plead-
ed. A mere general averment of fraud is noth-
ing more than the averment of a conclusion, 
and will not suffice. It presents no issue for 
trial, and is bad on demurrer. Such an aver-
ment not only renders the bill or complaint 
demurrable but it will not even sustain a de-
cree." (Emphasis supplied) 
In Smith v. Edu~ards, supra, the court pointed 
out that the complaint was further deficient in that 
there was no allegation of the amount of the indebt-
edness, the value of the land conveyed, nor the value 
of assets remaining after the conYeyance. In the 
instant case essential elements of the cause of action 
are not alleged. There is no allegation that Martin 
F. Dubin made the conveyance ''with the intent to 
delay, hinder or defraud creditors or other per-
sons . . . " as required by the code section. Para-
graph 5 of defendant's counterclaim alleges that 
both .deeds were executed, recorded and delivered 
with the calculated purpose by plaintiff herein and 
Martin F. Dubin "to obstruct orderly judicial pro-
10 
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cedure as it might be determined in the case of 
Dubin v. Dttbin, file number 123578, which was 
filed on December 8, 1959, and prior to the execu-
tion, delivery and recordation of the quit-cl~aim deed 
which is the basis for plaintiff's complaint." The 
obstruction of "orderly judicial procedure" is not 
the same as the required pleading of an intent "to 
delay, hinder or defraud creditors or other persons." 
It should also be noted that it is claimed that the 
deed of December 7, 1959 (under which pl!aintiff 
claims) was executed for the purpose of obstructing 
orderly judicial procedure in action number 12357'8 
which action was not even filed until the next day 
and which plaintiff and Martin F. Dubin had no 
way of knowing would be in existence on said date! 
Suffice it to say th~at the counter claim fails to allege 
the required element of fraudulent intent on the 
part of Martin F. Dubin. Likewise there is no alle-
gation that plaintiff "had previous notice of the 
fraudulent intent of his immediate grantor or of 
the fraud rendering void the title of such grantor." 
In Heidelberg v. Smith, 1959, 214 Ga. 785, 107 SE 
2d 844, it is stated: "In the present case, it is not 
alleged that the defendant had actual notice or reas-
onable grounds to suspect fraudulent intent on the 
part of the husband. The petition therefore, failed 
to allege a cattse of action based on fraud" (emphasis 
supplied). Defendant's allegation that plaintiff had 
11 
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knowledge of the "claims of Defendant Marjorie D. 
Dubin" is not capable of being construed as an ·alle-
gation that plaintiff had notice of the fraudulent 
intent of Martin F. Dubin. It is immaterial whether 
or not plaintiff knew of the "claims" of Marjorie D. 
Dubin if (1) in fact Martin F. Dubin did not have 
the requisite "fraudulent intent;" or ( 2) if he did 
have such intent plaintiff did not have knowledge of 
the said intent of Martin F. Dubin. Knowledge of 
the "'claims" might be considered as one factor in 
determining whether or not Martin F. Dubin had 
such fraudulent intent, but mere knowledge of the 
claims does not per se constitute a pleading of ·a 
fraudulent intent. 
Furthermore, the counterclaim fails to state 
that defendant is a "creditor" or "other person" 
within the meaning of the Act. This point will be 
discussed in detail under a point hereinafter. 
POINT II. 
THE ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM OF DE-
FENDANT FAIL TO ALLEGE FACTS SUFFICIENT 
TO CONSTITUTE A CAUSE OF ACTION TO ESTAB-
LISH A RE8ULTING TRUST IN FAVOR OF DEFEN-
DANT AND ANY EVIDENCE THEREON IS IN ·vi-
·OLATION OF THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE. 
The pleadings !and Pretrial Order are most con-
fusing as to the defendant's theory upon which her 
defenses or claims are based. Paragraph 9 of the 
main Pretrial Order states that defendant contented 
that the ·conveyance to plaintiff was fraudulent be-
12 
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cause ''it was an effort to convey property that be-
longed to the defendant" and further states that the 
court held that since the defendant 'admits that the 
property is held in joint tenancy that defendant had 
made a gift of it to the grantor and that such was 
no defense. Later the Pretrial Judge, Honorable 
Joseph G. Jeppson, allowed paragraph 9 to be amend-
ed to read that plaintiff received property from 
Martin F. Dubin which defendant alleges that al-
though title was held in joint tenancy that she was 
the equitable owner of the entire property. The Pre-
trial judge, however, stated in said Amended Pre-
trial order 
"Although the court has grave doubt 
about the validity of the contention, it was 
left for the trial court to determine whether 
or not it amounts to a defense." (Emphasis 
supplied) 
It is axiomatic that a resulting trust arises 
whfn there is a transfer of property under circum-
stances showing th~at the transferee was not in-
ten0ed to take the beneficial interest. Restatement 
Truc;ts, Section 404. It has been termed an "inten-
tion enforcing" trust to distinguish it from the other 
type of implied trust, the constructive or "fraud 
rectifying" trust. There is no claim that fraud was 
involved when the property was taken in joint ten-
ancy. Likewise, there are no allegations in defen-
dant's answer or counterclaim in which it is claimed 
13 
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1hat it was intended at the time of the creation of 
the joint tenancy that defendant was to be the bene-
ficiq,l owner of the entire property. InN eill v. Royce, 
Ut~h, 120 P. 2d 327 it is stated: · 
"However, at all times where an expres-
sed intention appeared on the face of the in-
strument indicating a joint tenancy, equity 
would allow the joint tenancy to prevail." 
In Lundgreen v. Lundgreen, Utah, 184 P. 2d 
670 it is stated: 
"The most widely accepted view is that 
the property passes as a gift inter vivos, pro-
vided there is donative intent and delivery. 
Christensen v. Ogden State Bank, 75 Utah 
4 78, 286 p. 638." 
''Where however, the parties h·ave entered 
into and expressed a writing a complete agree-
ment which is clear as to intent and purpose 
of the deposit, the intent so expressed will be 
given effect unless the instrument is success-
fully attacked for fraud, mistake, incapacity, 
or other infirmity, or unless it is shown by 
"clear and convincing proof" that the parties 
intended to have a different effect from that 
expressed.'' 
It is therefore, apparent that the joint tenancy 
deed fron1 defendant to Martin F. Dubin was ambig-
uous and may not be varied by parol evidence. In 
Anderson v. Cercone, 180 Pac. 586, 588, Utah, it 
is stated: 
''We are not unmindful of the rule that 
to establish a resulting trust ... in favor of 
14 
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one who furnished purchase money, public 
policy and the safety and security of titles to 
re'al estate, demand that the proof be scrutin-
ized with great caution, and that it be clear, 
definite, unequivocal, and conclusive. (Citing 
Chambers v. Emery, 13 Utah 374, 45 Pac. 
192)" 
In the instant case the pleadings are completely 
devoid of any allegations upon which a resulting 
trust can be predicated. In 13 Cal. Jur. 2d Section 13 
Cotenancy, P. 299 it is said: 
"Extraneous Matter to Change Charac-
ter where the effect of the agreement is to 
create a joint estate extraneous evidence can-
not be introduced to change the terms or legal 
effect of the agreement (Gurnsey Estate, 177 
C. 211 170 P. 402). Hence, oral declarations 
of the joint tenants may not be shown to es-
tablish a different estate. Nor is the former 
character of the property in such a case of 
'any consequence to alter the declaration of it 
as joint tenancy property (Kennedy vs. lVIc-
Murray, 169 C. 287, 146 P. 647)." 
B. FAILURE OF PROOF ON DEFENDANT'S 
COU .. VTERCLAIM OR DEFENSE. 
POINT III. 
DEFENDANT FAILED TO PROVE HER ALLEGED 
CAUSE OF ACTION OR DEFENSE UNDER THE 
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT, AT 25-1-8 UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, OR ANY CAUSE OF AC-
TION TO ESTABLISH A RESULTING TRUST. 
In equity cases, such as the instant case, the 
Supreme Court has authority to review the evidence 
~ and reYerse the judgment on the facts. Art. VIII, 
15 
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Section 9, Utah Constitution. Givan vs. Lambeth, 
May, 1960, Utah, 351, P. 2d 959, 10 Utah 2nd, 287. 
The party seeking to set aside a conveyance on the 
ground of fraud has the burden of proving a fraudu-
lent conveyance, which requires clear and convinc-
ing proof. Barker vs. Durham, Utah, 1959, 342 P. 
2d, 867, 9 Utah 2d 244. It is a maxim of our law 
that honesty is presumed. The burden of proving 
fraud is on the party alleging it, and it is a heavy 
burden. Circumstances which are merely suspicious 
are not enough to render a conveyance fraudulent. 
All of the elements must be supported by very sub-
stantial proofs. Columbia lnternatioool Corporation 
vs. Perry, 344 P. 2d 509. 
Even if it be assumed that a cause of action 
was pleaded under the Fraudulent Conveyance Act 
or to establish a resulting trust, the record is devoid 
of evidence to support either cause of action. As 
hereinafter discussed, certain findings necessary to 
support either action were not made. However, the 
findings that were m~ade by the trial court are not 
supported by substantial evidence and in most cases 
are not supported by any evidence. 
Finding No. 4 states in part that Exhibit No. 
4, a lis pendens applicable to Cause No. 123578 (the 
second divorce action filed December 8, 1959) was 
recorded at 1 :45 P.M. on December 8, 1959. There 
was no competent evidence presented !as to the re-
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cording time. Plaintiff stipulated to the admission 
of said exhibit but he specifically stated that he was 
not stipulating to the recording time since it ap-
peared on its face to have been altered ( T .R. p. 30). 
No evidence was put on by defendant to verify the 
recording time. Plaintiff alleged in his complaint 
that the recording time was 11:45 A.M. which would 
be before the time when the complaint mentioned 
in the lis pendens was filed. This claim by plain-
tiff was based upon his personal inspection of the 
files in the County Recorder's office on December 
8, 1959. 
The findings of the trial court (Finding No. 4) 
that the $12,000.00 down payment was paid from 
the funds of the defendant which she acquired be-
fore her marri'age and that Martin F. Dubin had 
made no payments in connection with said property 
is irrelevant and there is no substantial evidence or 
any evidence to support such findings. It was ad-
mitted in the pleadings that the property was taken 
by defendant and Martin F. Dubin in joint ten'ancy. 
There was no allegation of any fraud connected 
with the creation of such joint tenancy and there 
was no allegation that the joint tenancy deed ,did 
not accurately set forth the intention of the parties 
when said deed was executed. It was not until sev-
eral weeks before the trial of the instant action be-
fore defendant claimed that she was the equitable 
17 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
owner of the property. This claim was embodied in 
paragraph 9 of the Amended Pre-Trial Order but, 
significantly, the entire pleadings are devoid of any 
facts upon which such a conclusion can be based. 
The trial court at the Pre-Trial expressed "grave 
doubt about the validity of this contention." As here-
tofore discussed to allow evidence to be presented 
on this contention does violence to the p·arol evidence 
rule. However, we need not reach that point since 
there was no competent evidence presented to estab-
lish and prove such contention. It is to be noted that 
defendant in her amended complaint in the first 
divorce action (Civil No. 119467), claimed in para-
graph 5 that plaintiff accumulated the real pro-
perty prior to her marriage to Martin F. Dubin, 
while the Pre-Trial order in said action states (p. 2) 
that she claims the $12,000.00 was from earnings 
she made during her marri'age to Martin F. Dubin. 
She further claimed in said Pre-Trial Order that she 
"contributed" said $12,000.00 to build up an equity 
in the home. In her Answer to Interrogatory #15 
in Cause No. 119467 she cl'aimed that the monies 
were accumulated prior to her marriage to Martin 
F. Dubin. Where the p'arties have expressed in writ-
ing a complete argreement which is clear as to in-
tent and purposes, the intent so expressed will be 
given effect unless the instrument is successfully 
attacked for fraud, 1nistake, incapacity, or other 
infirmity, or unless it is shown by clear and convinc-
18 
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ing proof that the parties intended the instrument 
to have a different effect from th'at expressed. Neill 
vs. Royce, 120 P. 2d 327, Utah. And it cannot be 
said that defendant did not present all the evidence 
at her disposal to establish such ownership. At the 
trial the Court asked defendant's counsel, Dean 
Conder, " Are you satisfied with the evidence on 
your counterclaim?" Mr. Conder replied: "I 'am, 
your honor." (T. R. p. 35) 
Finding No. 2 states that defendant claimed 
in the suit filed in December, 1959, all of the right, 
title and interest in and to the real property. She did 
not claim that she owned all of the property or that 
she had a presently existing right to the property, 
or that the original joint tenancy deed was void. 
Rather, her complaint in both divorce actions mere-
ly alleged the circumstances surrounding the cre-
ation of the joint tenancy. Nowhere was it claimed 
in the divorce actions that she was the complete 
owner of the property. Rather, she sought to invoke 
the court's discretion to award to her all of the pro-
perty as a result of the divorce action. This is quite 
different than saying that she claimed a "right" 
to the property above and beyond what the court 
might do with the property in resolving a division 
of property. In her divorce action she, in one in-
stance, claimed that she "contributed" the property 
as hereinabove stated. The testimony of the plain-
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tiff in the instant action was not to effect that he 
knew that defendant claimed a "right" to all of the 
property. His testimony dealt with his knowledge 
as to what defendant claimed were the circumstances 
surrounding the creation of the joint tenan·cy. 
C. DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE STANDING 
TO BRING AN ACTION UNDER THE FRAUDULENT 
CONVEYANCE ACT, AT 25-1-8 UTAH CODE ANNO-
TATED, 1953. 
POINT IV. 
DEFENDANT IS NOT A CREDITOR OR OTHER 
PERSON WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE UTAH 
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT SINCE SHE WAS 
NOT AWARDED SUPPORT OR MAINTENANCE. 
There is ·a scarcity of Utah case authority con-
struing the meaning of the words "creditor" or 
"other person" as used in the Fraudulent Convey-
ance Act. At Common Law there was a split of auth-
ority as to whether or not a wife or child by virtue 
of right to support could maintain an action to set 
aside a fraudulent conveyance without reducing the 
claim to judgment. vVith the adoption of the Uni-
form Fraudulent Conveyance Act the claim of the 
creditor or other person can be matured, unmatured, 
liquidated, unliquidated, absolute, fixed or contin-
gent. Hozcever, there still must be a "claim" of some 
type. In the instant case it is to be noted, significant-
ly, that the counterclain1 was not filed until after 
the divorce action had been decided. If we assume 
that Utah law recognizes a "claim" in the wife due 
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to her right to support or maintenance it is then 
necessary to ascertain whether or not defendant at 
the time of the filing of her counterclaim had such 
a "claim" to support or maintenance. It is obvious 
from the decree entered in the second divorce action 
(cause No. 123578) that defendant was not awarded 
alimony or support as m'aintenance. She was granted 
a divorce, her maiden name was restored and she 
was awarded as her sole and separate property free 
and clear of any claims of the ,defendant Martin F. 
D~tbin in the described property. All she was award-
ed was her interest o'f record in one-half of the pro-
perty free and clear of the claims of Martin F. 
Dubin. Plaintiff herein was not a party defendant 
to s'aid divorce action even though under case auth-
ority defendant herein could have made plaintiff 
herein a party. He could not have his rights affected 
in his absence. It is to be noted that defendant and 
her two attorneys had personal knowledge of the 
fact th~at Martin F. Dubin had conveyed his inter-
est in the property to plaintiff herein, but at the 
trial of the divorce action they chose to remain silent 
on this point when the property was being discussed 
and was at issue by the court. In fact an estoppel 
n1ay well exist against defendant to now 'assert her 
alleged claims after once having deceived the court 
into a mistaken belief as to the status of the legal 
title to the property. A case squarely in point is 
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Adamson v. Adamson, 55 Utah 544, 188 Pac. 635, 
in which proceedings for divorce were not contested 
and a decree was entered in favor of the wife. There 
was no alimony awarded and no child support. Prior 
to the divorce action the husband and wife were 
joint owners of real property. In the action seeking 
to set aside 'a conveyance made by the husband of 
his interest to his father just before the commence-
ment of the divorce action, the wife alleged that 
conveyance was fraudulent in that it was made to 
defraud her of some $2,300 owing to her by the 
husband and of any alimony th'at might be awarded 
to her by the court. The property had a value of 
$2,500 and it was conveyed to the husband's father 
for $1,250, payable $250.00 in cash and in two in-
stallment p·ayments of $500 each over a two year 
period. The lower court held against the wife, stat-
ing that the complaint was insufficient as a credi-
tor's bill since it didn't show that the wife had pro-
cured a judgment or that the husband was insolvent. 
The appellate court affirmed, citing Nielson v. Niel-
son, 30 Utah 391, 85 Pac. 429 and stating 
"Under the authority aboYe cited the hus-
band had the right to sell his interest subject 
only to his wife's one-third interest in case 
she continued to be his wife and survived 
him." 
The instant case is even stronger in that Martin 
F. Dubin did not owe his wife any 1noney at the 
22 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
time of the conveyance as in the Ad,amson case and 
he did not owe or was he obligated to pay his wife 
alimony after his wife's divorce decree was granted. 
In T~tlly Y. T~tlly, 137 C 60, 69 P. 700 and 
Clopton v. Clopton, 162 C 27, 121 P. 720, it is said: 
"It is only to the extent that the wife's 
right to s·upport h'as been affected by the 
transfer that she has any legal ground of com-
plaint entitling her to avoid the transfer." 
(Emphasis supplied) 
It is to be noted that in the Clopton case there 
was no consideration for the transfer. In M~trray v. 
M~trray, 115 C 266, 47 P. 37 it is held that even a 
fraudulent transfer should not be set aside any fur-
ther than is necessary to secure the maintenance 
allowed the wife by the court and any property not 
needed for such security should be restored to the 
transferee. See also Huellmantel v. H~tellmantel, 124 
C 583, 57 P. 582 where there was a fraudulent 
transfer but the court held that the interest of the 
grantee may be adjudged to be subject only to the 
wife's lien for alimony, counsel fees, and legitimate 
costs. 
In the instant case it is the position of plaintiff 
that the conveyance was not fraudulent but that 
under the facts of the instant case it would not make 
any difference in any event due to the fact that at 
the time of defendant't counterclaim she was not a 
"creditor" or "other person" since there was no 
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"claim" of any type that she might or could assert 
against Martin F. Dubin. When she failed to secure 
alimony or support any claim that she might have 
had was destroyed. In Parker v. Parker, 148 Ga. 
196, 96 SE 211 it was held that a plaintiff wife's 
right to have a conveyance cancelled is dependant 
on her right to a judgment for alimony. In Arteaga 
v. Arteaga, 169 Ga. 59'5, 151 SE 5 it was held that 
since the wife couldn't get a decree for alimony 
(the husband had died) she couldn't set ,aside a 
fraudulent conveyance. See also Draper v. Draper, 
68 Ill. 17, where it was held that a conveyance by 
the husband to his brother pendente lite, in order 
to defraud his wife in her claim or alimony, 
was fraudulent only to the extent of the claim 
for alimony, and that it was error to set aside the 
conveyance. In Sorrells v. Sorrells, 162 Ga. 734, 134 
SE 76 an action for divorce was filed and then there 
was a reconciliation. Husband then died and wife 
sought to set aside a conveyance because it was alle-
gedly in fraud of her claim for alimony. The court 
held that since de,ath of husband made award of ali-
mony impossible equity has no jurisdiction or power 
to cancel the deed. See also ll'" allace v. llr allace, 189 
Ga. 220, 5 SE 2d 580 where it was held that the 
wife was not a "creditor" if the husband wasn't 
in default in alin1ony payments. In the instant case 
no alimony payments are possible. For a general 
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discussion of the wife's right to maintenance or ali-
tnony as within protection or rule avoiding convey-
ances or transfers in fraud of creditors or persons 
to whom maker is under a legal liability. See anno-
tation at 79 ALR 421. 
D. FAILURE TO FIND ON MATERIAL ISSUES. 
POINT V. 
THE COURT FAILED TO FIND ON MATERIAL 
FACTS OR ISSUES UNDER AN ACTION BASED ON 
THE FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT AT 25-1-8, 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 19'53. 
It is reversible error for the court to fail to 
make findings of fact on material issues. Under 
the Fraudulent Conveyance Act certain essential 
elements must be found. In the instant case the fol-
lowing findings were not made by the court : 
1. That Martin F. Dubin did or did not h~ave 
!,·. a fraudulent intent to delay, hinder or defraud 




,, 2. That defendant was or was not a creditor 
or other person under said act. 
3. That the conveyance to plaintiff was or was 
not for a fair consideration as defined at 25-1-3, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
4. That plaintiff was or was not a purchaser 
for a valuable consideration within the meaning of 
25-1-13, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
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5. That plaintiff did or did not have notice 
of the fraudulent intent of his grantor or of the 
fraud rendering void the title of such grantor. 
6. The value of the land conveyed. 
7. The value of the consideration paid to Mar-
tin F. Dubin by pl'aintiff. 
These finding were not made even though de-
fendant's counsel stated in open court that he was 
satisfied with the evidence. 
POINT VI. 
ASSUMING THAT DEFENDANT'S ANSWER AND 
COUNTERCLAIM SET FORTH A CAUSE OF ACTION 
TO ESTABLISH A RESULTING TRUST THE COURT 
FAILED TO FIND ON MATERIAL FACTS OR ISSUES. 
As heretofore stated an action to establish are-
sulting trust has been called an "intention enforc-
ing" cause of action. In the instant case the court 
failed to make the following findings : 
1. That at the time of the execution of the 
joint tenancy deed the parties did or did not intend 
to create a joint tenancy with all its incidents of 
ownership. 
2. What was the intention of the parties when 
the joint tenancy deed was executed. 
3. What portion, if any, of the interest in the 
land is subject to a resulting trust. 
4. What were the respective contributions of 
the p'arties to the consideration paid for the property. 
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E. EFFECT OF INSTITUTION OF DIT?ORCE 
PROCEEDING BY lVIFE. 
POINT VII. 
THE INSTITUTION OF A DIVORCE ACTION 
DOES NOT PUT THE PROPERTY INTO THE CUS-
TODY OF THE COURT AND DOES NOT PREVENT 
THE EXERCISE OF THE HUSBAND'S POWERS OVER 
THE PROPERTY. 
In the leading case of S1Jn Insur~ance Co. v. 
White, 123 C 196, 55 P. 902 it was held that the 
pendency of proceedings for divorce does not of it-
self interrupt the exercise of the husband's power 
of disposition of the community property or of his 
separate property though he is held to good faith. 
The Sun case cites Lord v. Haugh, 43 Cal. 581 and 
1._ 
states: 
"The pendency of proceedings for di-
vorce does not of itself interrupt the exercise 
of the husband's powers. The property does 
not come into the custody of the court by in-
stitution of the suit. The husband has still 
the control of it and full power of disposi-
tion of it. He is held to equ'al good faith in all 
transactions relating to it :as before the com-
mencement of the action." (Emphasis sup-
plied) 
See also Estate of Harris, 9 C 2d 649, 659 where 
it is stated: 
"It is one of the incidents of a joint ten-
ancy that either joint tenant may convey his 
separate estate by way of gift or otherwise 
without the approval or consent of his other 
joint tenant and upon such conveyance the 
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joint tenancy is terminated. (Delaney v. Del-
aney, 216 Cal. 23, 13 P. 2d 513)" 
See also Adamson v. Adamson, 55 Utah 544 188 
Pac. 635 'and Nielson v. Nielson, 30 Utah 391, 85 
Pac. 429 wherein it is held that the husband had 
the right to sell his interest subject only to his wife's 
one third interest in case she continued to be his 
wife and survived him. 
F. ATTORNEY'S FEES AS CONSIDERATION 
FOR A CONVEYANCE. 
POINT VIII. 
A CONVEYANCE MADE TO THE HUSBAND'S 
ATTORNEY IN A DIVORCE ACTION IS AS VALID 
AS ANY OTHER CONVEYANCE MADE FOR VALU-
ABLE CONSIDERATION AND \VITHOUT INTENT TO 
HINDER, DELAY OR DEFRAUD CREDITORS OR 
OTHER PERSONS. 
In the instant case the trial court suffered 
under the misapprehension that in order for plain-
tiff to prevail he must be "innocent of her ( defen-
dant) rights" (T. R. p. 34). The "right" the trial 
judge made reference to was defined by him 'as "a 
right to have this property disposed of in the di-
vorce action" ( T. R. p. 34). The court did not bother 
to make a determination as to whether or not the 
plaintiff's grantor had a fraudulent intent or wheth-
er or 11ot plaintiff had knowledge of such fraudu-
lent intent. The court likewise was not concerned 
as to whether or not the consideration paid by plain-
tiff to his grantor was fair. Apparently, the trial 
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cot1rt's v1ew of the fraudulent conveyance statute 
is that if a purchaser knows that his grantor is be-
ing divorced and knows that the wife is seeking an 
interest the property that the conveyance to such 
purchaser is void and it is immaterial that: ( 1 ) 
there was valuable and fair consideration for the 
tr·ansfer (2) there was no fraudulent intent by the 
grantor (3) there was no knowledge by grantee of 
'any fraudulent intent of his grantor, or ( 4) that 
the wife may or may not be a "creditor" or "other 
person" under the statute. By no stretch of the 
imagination can it be said that the state of the law 
is as held by the trial court. Under the theory ad-
vanced by the trial court no creditor or potential 
creditor of the husband could ever de'al effectively 
with the husband if such creditor knew of the di-
vorce action. In the instant case plaintiff had ren-
dered approximately one and one-hal'f years legal 
services to his grantor in connection with the in-
volved and complex divorce actions and in connec-
tion with his grantor's business ~and practice in 
California. The grantor testified that it was agreed 
that said fee was reasonably worth '$3,000.00 and 
that plaintiff was the one who requested the con-
veyance. Can it be said that plaintiff should be dis-
criminated against as a creditor merely because he 
happens to be grantor's attorney and has been will-
ing to permit the amount of the bill for legal services 
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to increase substantially because his grantor is just 
commencing the practice of medicine? At the trial 
plaintiff attempted to point out to the court that 
there were many cases (which plaintiff was ready 
to cite) in which a conveyance to an attorney who 
represented a grantor in a divorce action was held 
not fraudulent and entirely proper. Upon attempt-
ing to do so the court showed its prejudice and fail-
ure to understand the principles of the Fraudulent 
Conveyance Act when the court stated without any 
justification: (T.R. p. 35) 
"THE COURT: If you were a member of 
this Bar, I would recommend to the Disciplin-
·ary Commission that you be brought before 
them for discipline. That is what I would do 
as far as the case is concerned, but being a 
member of the State of California Bar we are 
not concerned with your law practice. I would 
suggest as far as you are concerned, your 
ethical morals are pretty low." 
It is to be noted that the very judge making 
said statement is the same judge who apparently was 
not at all concerned that at the defendant's divorce 
trial, over which he presided, two attorneys repre-
senting defendant, as officers of the court failed to 
disclose the material fact that the interest of Mar-
tin F. Dubin as a joint tenant in the property had 
been previously quit-claimed to plain tiff! Normally 
matters such as the court's remarks to plaintiff 
would not be included in a brief such as this, but 
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in view of the seriousness and severity of the court's 
comments and the complete lack of found'ation (based 
upon applicable law) the plaintiff as a member of 
the Bar and a proud member of his profession feels 
that it is necessary to call the matter to the court's 
attention. 
There are innumerable cases in which a con-
veyance made to an attorney has been held entirely 
proper. In point is the following quotation from 16 
Cal. J ur. 2d Section 250 Divorce and Separation: 
"In the absence of actual fraud, a transfer by 'a hus-
band to a creditor in consideration of the extinguish-
ment of an antecedent indebtedness is not an un-
lawful preference that can be set aside by the wife 
seeking divorce.'' 
For 'an excellent annotation discussing attor-
neys fees as affecting conveyance for value and con-
sideration see 45 ALR 2d 514. In Thiess v. Thiess, 
' 111 Nebraska 805, 198 NW 151 a mortgage was 
given to attorneys for services to be performed and 
at that time performed. The attorneys h'ad appeared 
twice in the Superior Court in the divorce action 
and twice in the district court. The fees were held to 
be in an amount not exceeding a reasonable fee for 
services which might reasonably be anticipated. The 
court upheld the validity of the mortgage citing 
Farmers' and Merch.ants' Bank v. Mosher, 63 Neb-
raska 130, 88 NW 552, where it is stated: 
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"An insolvent debtor has the right to em-
ploy attorneys to defend his estate and him-
self and to transfer his property in payment 
of such contemplated services, provided it is 
done in good faith and the property trans-
ferred does not exceed a reason'able fee for 
the service which might be reasonably anti-
cipated.'' 
In the instant case the conveyance was for past 
services, cash and the execution of a promissory note 
for $5,000.00 which plaintiff and his grantor testi-
fied together approximated one-half of the equity 
defendant and plaintiff's grantor had in the real 
property. The mortgage was also assumed. For other 
cases upholding conveyances involving attorney's 
fees see: Reina v. Erossarret, 90 Cal. App. 2d 1, 203 
P. 2d 72; Morroq~tin v. Barriall, 345 P. 2d 30, 175 
Cal. App. 2d 540 and Reinheimer v. Rhedans, 327 
SW 2d 823 (1959). See also Hedden v. Waldeck, 9 
Cal. 2d 631, 72 Pac. 2d 114 wherein a deed convey-
ing real property to an attorney in payment for 
services was upheld against the contention that the 
purpose of the transfer was to prevent collection of 
a judgment subsequently obtained in a suit against 
the grantor pending at the time of transfer. 
Plaintiff calls the court's attention that in 
Adamson v. Adamson, Utah, 55 Utah 544, 188 Pac. 
635, a divorce action, the grantee (father of the 
husband) knew of the divorce action and paid 
$1,250, one-half the value of the property for a 
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I 
,. 
one-half interest therein, payable $250 in cash and 
rem'ainder in two installments of $500 during a 
two year ·period. The court said that the installment 
method of payment was proper. The court's atten-
tion is also called to the leading case of Sun I ns~tr­
ance Co. v. White, 123 C 196, 55 P. 902 in which a 
lis pendens was filed and in which the pl'aintiff 
grantee had actual notice of the divorce action. The 
conveyance was there upheld. 
In Lewis v. Lewis, 1954, 210 Ga. 330, 80 SE 
2d 312, a husband conveyed a house and lot to his 
attorney for $500 ~attorney's fees, a note for $700 
and assumption of loan against the property. The 
court therein stated: "As to whether the defendant 
Graham knew or had reasonable ground to suspect 
the fraudulent intention of the husband - this issue 
likewise was one for the jury. The fact that the con-
veyance was one from a client to his attorney does 
not of itself show that the transaction was fraudu-
lent, but such a transaction was subject to a more 
careful scrutiny than one between strangers." The 
court pointed out that the jury could consider the 
fact that the attorney didn't look at the premises 
or make an independent examination of the value 
of the husband's equity. In the instant case plaintiff 
and his grantor testified that they both inspected 
the property and visited Deseret Federal Savings 
and Loan Association to determine the amount still 
owing on the mortgage. 
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See also the recent Utah case of Givan v. Lam-
beth, Utah, May, 1960, 10 Utah 2d 287, 351 P. 2d 
959, wherein Chief Justice Crockett states that the 
evidence can be reviewed by the Supreme Court and 
in which a transaction between close relatives was 
upheld. 
G. LIS PENDENS. 
POINT IX. 
THE LIS PENDENS ARE NOT MATERIAL TO A 
DETERMINATION OF THE ISSUES. 
It is the position of plaintiff that the lis pen-
dens are not materi~al to a determination of the is-
sues of the case since plaintiff stipulated in open 
court that he had full knowledge of the pleadings in 
the first action. As attorney of record along with E. 
R. Callister and then Walter Budge plaintiff knew 
full well the cl'aims asserted by defendant. How-
ever, under the case authority herein cited such 
knowledge is immaterial if in fact the conveyance 
was made without fraudulent intent on the part of 
the grantor or without knowledge by grantee of the 
fraudulent intent of his grantor. Mere knowledge of 
the claims of defend·ant is not tantamount to a find-
ing that the grantor had a fraudulent intent or that 
grantee had knowledge of such fraudulent intent. 
True, such knowledge of defendant's claims may be 
a factor to be considered in determining intent but 
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It is to be noted, however, that the deed of 
December 7, 1959, under which plaintiff claims his 
interest was executed, delivered and recorded prior 
to the lis pendens filed on December 8, 1959. The 
earlier lis pendens is ineffective since the action was 
dismissed. It has been held that where the action 
is not prosecuted to judgment but instead is settled 
or dismissed, the subsequent purchaser or encum-
brancer is unaffected by the lis pendens, for he takes 
subject only to a judgment concerning the title. 
Alson v. Corrnvell, (1933) 134 CA 419, 427, 25 P. 
2d 879; Harris v. Whittier B. & L. Association 
(1936) 18 CA 2d 260, 266, 63 P. 2d 840. 
The lis pendens is incidental to the action in 
which it is filed, and is ineffective to give notice 
of a future, though similar action. Gar·cia v. Pin-
he?~o, ( 1937) 22 CA 2d 194, 70 P. 2d 675. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court has erred in ·a number of par-
ticulars, anyone of which require a reversal and a 
judgment in favor of plaintiff on his complaint for 
partition of real property and an 'accounting of rent-
al income. The judgment should be reversed with 
judgment in favor of plaintiff and a retrial should 
not be ordered since defendant stated in court that 
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she was satisfied with the evidence presented on her 
counterclaim. A retrial will cause hardship on plain-
tiff due to his residence outside the State of Utah. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN D. GLYNN 
In Propria Persona 
9171 Wilshire Boulevard 
Beverly Hills, California 
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